Modelling constructs for specifying semantic integrity are reviewed, and their implicit execution semantics discussed. An integrity maintenance model based on these constructs is presented. An implementation of this model in a persistent programming language is described, allowing exible automated dynamic integrity management for applications updating a persistent store this implementation is based on an event-driven architecture. persistent programming, conceptual modelling, semantic integrity, active object-oriented databases, code generation
Introduction
Napier88 MBCD89], DCBM89] is a high-level, strongly-typed, block structured programming language with orthogonal persistence Coc82] that is, objects of any t ype created by programs can outlive the execution of the program which created them. Persistent o b j e c t s c a n b e r e u s e d i n a t ype-secure way b y subsequent executions of the same program, or by other programs.
Persistent languages are well-suited to the construction of data-intensive applications Coo90] programs are written to manipulate data, and the inbuilt (and transparent) persistence mechanism provides for its storage and retrieval.
This article describes an integrity management system (IMS) written in Napier88 this forms part of a larger system which supports the development of persistent application systems BK92]. This integrity management system allows its user to specify constraints on data in a high level, declarative notation, and then ensures that the data respects these constraints. The system infers what events could compromise the integrity of the data, and then on these events checks those objects which could have beena ected. Further, the system provides activeness for the database 1 , by allowing the speci cation of Condition-Action rules, called triggers, w h i c h call procedures automatically whenever speci ed conditions are met. The operation of this integrity management system is transparent to application programmers.
Section 2 overviews the type of integrity information which can be speci ed for this system, with comparisons to those o ered by some recent database systems section 3 examines constructs, provided by the system, to allow management o f how integrity is maintained section 4 overviews the implementation of the system.
Specifying Integrity
Specifying integrity constraints is part of the process of information modelling. Attaching a collection of constraints to some data re nes the precision with which that data is described, and may lead to a greater understanding of the data. Specifying constraints is also part of the process of database design any i n tegrity constraints which can be supported by the database reduce the task of the application programmer (since she need not code these constraints), and increases con dence in the integrity for the data (since this is under centralised control). However, the level of support for integrity provided by m a n y database systems is not high, although it has been estimated that as much as 80% of a typical database de nition may be concerned with integrity speci cation Dat87, page 455].
In succeeding sections, some mechanisms available for expressing constraints on data will be considered. The notation used for examples is NOODL (Napier Object Oriented Data Language), a conceptual-level object oriented data description language based on the data description notation used in BK91]. This language is fairly representative of various recent object oriented data description languages, but has the advantage of not being tied to any particular database management system (DBMS) it will be used to discuss integrity speci cation in general, and will also serve as source code to specify integrity information to the IMS.
The term`constraints' here is intended to mean explicit constraints that capture some additional fact about the real world enterprise being mod- elled, rather than constraints implicit in the data model chosen TL82]. Note that NOODL incorporates integrity speci cation with inheritance, since constraints (and, as described later, triggers) on any class are inherited by its subclasses, where they may optionally be overridden (rede ned).
Predicate Based Constraints
A predicate based constraint simply says that some fact is true of the data. An example is shown in the NOODL schema in gure 1 where it is asserted that an employee must bebetween 16 and 65 years of age, or in gure 2, where it is asserted that the area of a circle must be times its radius squared. The normal method of enforcing such a constraint is to forbid updates which violate it for example, the DBMS would refuse to allow an application program to update an employee's age to 5. This is the principle behind the de ne integrity construct of Ingres Dat87], the data restriction of Generis gen90, pages 4/12 -4/19], and ic command of FDL Pou88]. However, other options are possible. Constraint-satisfaction techniques Lel88] allow relationships to bespeci ed among a numberof objects, and then, when prov i d e d w i t h v alues for some of these objects, can nd values for the others which m a i n tain the constraint. In particular application areas, constraint satisfaction has proved very e ective Bor77]. Using such techniques one could envisage a database which would allow a user to reset either the radius or the area of a circle object, and would reset the other value in accordance with the constraint labelled area_rule. However, constraint-satisfaction systems are di cult to implement, do not run fast, and are application-speci c, typically handling numeric constraints therefore this approach has not generally beenused for enforcing constraints in conventional database systems. Further, the user must be prepared to have unknown a s a v alue for some properties.
Derived Properties
Many newer database systems also o er derived properties, which provide an alternative way of expressing some constraints implicitly. Examples of these are the tuple functions of Postgres pos90], or the derived functions of Iris LW91].
As an example, the circle schema in gure 2 could be rewritten as in gure 3.
The rst schema (A) has a symmetry of expression absent in the second. It states that a circle will have a radius and an area, and that the relationship between these two quantities is as expressed in the constraint labelled area_rule. The second schema (B) removes this symmetry in expression of the constraint b y showing how the area may be derived from the radius. The implicit execution semantics are, that in case (A) the user may u p d a t e either property, but in (B) only the radius is updatable (which requires a little extra e ort if it is the new area that is known).
These implicit execution semantics suggest that representation (A) is more conceptually accurate in this case. However, it may be required to model situations where one property g e n uinely is conceptually derived from others. For example, the pro t of a company may be found by adding together its various sources of income, and deducting taxes, payments to employees and other outgoings. It is unlikely that a user would wish to assign arbitrarily a new value to the pro t rather than to one of the contributing factors.
Note that the expression showing how the property is to be derived is a`conceptual' speci cation of its derivation it is not an indication of how values are actually stored or computed in some implementation, since optimisations may be applied.
(Event)-Condition-Action Rules
Another mechanism provided to support integrity is the rule. Deductive databases have extended this to support sophisticated inferencing, whereas other systems support simple rules only. For example, HiPAC D a y88] supports Event-Condition-Action rules which represent asynchronous actions associated with a change of state. These are similar to the self-triggering rules of OZ+ WL89]. Postgres supports rules SJGP87] the basic format of which i s ON event TO object WHERE condition DO action NOODL provides Condition-Action rules, introduced by the NOODL reserved word trigger, w h i c h specify the action to occur when some condition is met. It is also possible to obtain the functionality of If-When rules 2 and Event-Action rules 3 using this construct.
We m a y consider the constraints described earlier to be a special case of these Condition-Action rules, where the action to be taken is the abortion 2`i f A then B' is equivalent to`not A or B'. 3`o n update to property do action' can be expressed as property = zerovalue or true : action', since the predicate will be evaluated on any update to the property, and will always be true. A suitable syntactic sugaring for this may b e provided in the future. of an o ending process. The word rule will therefore beused as a generic term for constraints and triggers together. However, the two concepts are distinguished for a number of reasons. Firstly, a trigger res when the predicate describing its condition-part is true, whereas a constraint aborts a process when its predicate is false. It will be seen later that it is also useful to be able to manage the enforcement of the two constructs separately for example, suspended triggers are permitted to persist un red when a program terminates, but suspended constraints may not remain unveri ed. Rules permit the modeller to capture more semantics about data, particularly about its behaviour. For example, the schema in gure 1 can be revised to that in gure 4. Here, the trigger retiral introduces a rule which says that if an employee becomes 65 or older, the operation retire (not de ned here) should be applied to her. (Some suitable mechanism can be used to prevent re-ring of the trigger retiral on further updates of the age, preferably by migrating the object to a new class Pensioner for which no such trigger is de ned).
However, rules introduce procedurality i n to the speci cation it can be hard to foresee the consequences of a large numberof (perhaps mutually activating) rules being red, and such a system is not necessarily deterministic. One possible solution is to introduce rule priorities, as described in ACL91]. (The system described in section 4 does not support priorities, but is deterministic in the sense that the same transaction, run on the same database state, will always produce the same sequence of rule-ring).
How a Constraint is Enforced is Part of its Meaning
The database designer has almost too much choice for how to specify her understanding of the data but the choice of expression carries some extra information. For example, value propagation BCG + 87] may be represented by a n y of the above m e c hanisms. If it is required to specify that the door of a car must be the same colour as the body, then an explicit predicate based constraint assumes that bothcolours should beupdated together. With a derived property, the colour of the door can be made subordinate to the colour of the body. Using triggered updates, subtleties can berepresented such a s s a ying that changing the colour of the car changes the colour of the door, but not vice versa a red car has a red door, but if the door is expressly made blue, that is a customisation and nothing is to be assumed about the colour of the body.
Ideally, there should be a larger numberofintegrity speci cations, each embodying one fact about the model, rather than fewer, each expressing more information. This not only simpli es reading the schema and enables the database to report violations more meaningfully, b u t discourages oversights like failing to specify that the reason an employee is not aged over 65 is that she will have retired.
In the above example, the integrity speci cation has progressed from the assertion that an employee is aged between 16 and 65 to the assertions that an employee is aged over 16, and that an employee becoming older than 65 retires. Consider two programs updating the database such that one sets the age of an employee to be under 16, and the other sets the age of an employee to be over 65. In the rst case, it is known only that the updating program is in error 4 but in the second case it was known in advance that the reason an employee could not beolder than 65 is that she would have already retired hence, by simply forbidding this by a predicate, as in gure 1, one fails to capture part of the meaning of the constraint.
Thus how a constraint is enforced is part of its meaning, and it is desirable for a data model to provide a variety of methods of constraint enforcement. Ideally, the modeller may understand in advance what a violation would signify, and install a rule to readjust the database accordingly. A constraint m a y be speci ed implicitly by s h o wing how t h e v alue of one property is derived from others, so that a query on the derived property will produce the correct value. Finally, a predicate may be speci ed which data must satisfy, precluding updates which violate it. Here the modeller is admitting that she cannot foresee the circumstances of a violation (of course, this is sometimes unavoidable). Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that it is the update which violates the constraint, rather than some earlier update, which is in error, especially where the constraint i n volves a large numberof objects but this may beresolved since a failed update will usually entail the intervention of a human.
A predicate-based constraint o ers the greatest declarativeness of speci cation, but in a conventional DBMS the method of maintaining the constraint i s t ypically simply to abort any transaction which violates it. Rules allow more capture of behaviour of the data, at the cost of the introduction of some procedurality Event-Condition-Action rules require the user to state after what events activation of the rule is to be considered. Derived properties provide a goodmechanism to express the constraints implicit iǹ emergent' and`immutable' properties (where respectively the expression to beevaluated is or is not a function of the state of other database objects) in some contexts however they may introduce an arti cial asymmetry into the speci cation.
Managing Integrity
This section considers the model according to which semantic integrity is maintained. The kinds of rules the programmer may wish to specify over her data have been reviewed without yet considering how to implement these rules, it is necessary to provide mechanisms for the management of their enforcement.
The traditional model of integrity enforcement in database systems is the transaction model (see, for example, EN89, chapter 19]) the transaction is a construct which c o m bines atomicity, serialisability, and recoverability. In Sut90], Sutton argues that many systems require a more exible approach to the maintenance of consistency. Rather than have all-or-nothing consistency, speci c processes may require the enforcement or violation of speci c constraints, regardless of whether they are enforced generally moreover, speci c processes may wish to choose when and where integrity is guaranteed, or may be violated.
It is desirable for the integrity m a i n tenance model adopted to be as gen-eral as possible within certain restrictions. The principle restrictions are as follows. Presently, Napier88 is a single-user system there is no possibility of concurrent processes attempting simultaneously to access the store, so concurrency management constructs are not required. Another restriction arises through the way the persistent store works. As objects are referenced in a program, they are mapped from disk into memory, where they may beupdated. When a stabilise operation is performed, updated memory objects are mapped back o n to disk. Therefore, in order to prevent updates from being committed when a transaction fails, the mapping back to disk of memory objects must be prevented, which unfortunately requires the abortion of the process to which the memory is allocated. This means that there is no possibility o f persistent transactions 5 , o r o f nested t r ansactions Mos81], since uncommitted local copies of objects cannot survive a stabilise operation (or, equivalently, program termination).
(This restriction depends on the fact that it is natural, but not ideal, to build the commit operation, which controls the conceptual consistency of the data, on the stabilise operation, which manages the persistence of program objects. In a system where uncommitted local copies of objects could persist, this restriction would belifted. Discussion of such a system is outwith the scope of this article).
Integrity Management Constructs
The constructs described below are provided by the IMS the argument to any of the rst ve constructs is a list of the constraints to which it applies, or one of the shorthand tags TRIGGERS, which applies it to all triggers, CONSTRAINTS, which applies it to all constraints, or ALL which applies it to all of both. The commit construct requires no arguments. enforce ensures that any subsequent operations respect the constraints speci ed if a violation occurs, the violating process is aborted. Speci ed triggers are red when the appropriate condition is met. ignore allows subsequent operations to violate the speci ed constraints freely speci ed triggers are never red when their activation conditions are met. suspend also allows subsequent operations to violate the speci ed constraints however, any updated objects which m i g h t be in violation of some constraint are logged. Similarly, triggers whose activation conditions are met are logged (but not red). status simply shows whether the constraint or trigger is enforced, ignored or suspended.
clear clears the logs created by suspend. Any logged triggers are red, and any logged constraints checked failure of a constraint c heck aborts the process. commit commits all updates since the last commit operation. Since persistent transactions are forbidden, an attempt to commit while logged objects are still unveri ed will abort the process attempting to commit. It should be noted that a constraint is enforced, suspended or ignored for the entire class of objects on which i t i s d e n e d . The di culties of attempting e ciently to apply rules to individual objects is described in SRH].
By including these constructs in her programs, a programmer may h a ve detailed control over how integrity is maintained. However, it is her own responsibility t o ensure that the constructs used interact as intended. For example, the traditional transaction model can be extended to include procedure calls, rather than simple reads and writes, within a transaction. Now, if the programmer intends to run an assertion-transaction, she might p l a c e enforce(THIS_CONSTRAINT) at the beginning of the block w h i c h constitutes the intended transaction it must be ensured that no procedure called from within this block contains an uncancelled suspend(ALL) construct, which would destroy the semantics of the intended transaction.
Whereas this problem can be avoided by ensuring that every procedure leaves its integrity m a i n tenance context unaltered, a better approach is perhaps to use the integrity management constructs to build transaction constructs of the required type, and use these except where occasion demands more detailed control. Within the above-mentioned restrictions of the persistent programming approach, the constructs provided should be su cient to build any required transaction primitives such as those for conventional at transactions, assertion-transactions and repair-enforce transactions (see Sut90] for more details). Flat transactions are considered below as an example. Figure 5 shows how a c o n ventional at transaction, providing integrity, recoverability and atomicity, might be constructed. The gure de nes a procedure, transact, which runs another procedure, updates, i n a c o n text where all constraints are suspended. If the updates are successful, they are committed, otherwise the transaction is aborted the transaction records its progress in a transcript le as it proceeds. For convenience, it is assumed that the procedures save_status and restore_status (built from the status construct) have already been de ned, so that the transaction can leave its its integrity maintenance context unaltered. If the user has a procedure my_updates which alters the persistent store, she may run it as a transaction by calling transact(my_updates()). Atomicity is provided by running the updates inside a procedure call.
When used with constraints, the integrity management constructs can provide a very exible form of transaction functionality. However, these constructs are also useful in controlling the enforcement of triggers. For example, triggers may be activated and deactivated using enforce and ignore in this way, once-only triggers (eg, Hug91]) may be implemented.
Note that commit will succeed (with appropriate warning) while logged triggers (but not constraints) remain un red. In this way, trigger execution may b e : immediate, using enforce(TRIGGERS) delayed, using suspend(TRIGGERS) and clear(TRIGGERS) o r detached (run in a separate transaction), using suspend(TRIGGERS), commit, a n d clear(TRIGGERS). Clearly, the semantics of an updating program will depend on which coupling mode is used. (Consider the e ects of an annual-review transaction, which triggers a 5% pay increase for all employees, followed by a transaction which res all employees earning over $20000).
Implementing Integrity
The kinds of statements one might like to make regarding the integrity of data, and how c o n trol of this integrity might be managed in programs, have been discussed now it remains to describe how support for this integrity maintenance is to beimplemented. The ideal is to allow a programmer to specify in a conceptual notation what constraints are required, and then allow her to write programs manipulating this data, secure in the knowledge that the integrity speci ed is being maintained. No code should appear in ! construct to support conventional transaction
let transact = proc(updates: proc()) begin ! transact let t_id = id_giver() ! assign ID to transaction transcript("transaction " ++ t_id ++ " initiated'n") if transacting do { transcript("nested execution of transaction " ++ t_id ++ " attempted'n") abort() ! Napier88 predefined abort procedure } ! if commit() transcript("transaction " ++ t_id ++ " precommitted'n") save_status() suspend(CONSTRAINTS) transacting := true ! set global flag to prevent nesting updates() ! run the user's update procedure transacting := false ! unset flag restore_status() ! restore integrity maintenance context transcript("transaction " ++ t_id ++ " ran updates'n") clear(CONSTRAINTS) ! check suspended constraints, fire suspended triggers commit() ! everything is ok if it got this far, so commit changes transcript("transaction " ++ t_id ++ " postcommitted and terminated'n") end ! transact Figure 5 : Construct for Conventional Flat Transaction user programs to verify constraints or re triggers this would not only complicate application programming, but also reduce con dence in the integrity of the database. Evolution of the application schema is also considerably complicated when the code which maintains integrity is scattered among user programs. Moreover, it is required that constraints are veri ed and triggers red whenever necessary, but there should beminimal redundant checking. Given that a constraint may beconsidered to bea special case of a trigger, the mechanism will be described with respect to constraints without loss of generality.
In the rst subsection an event-driven integrity management system is described, providing automated support for speci ed integrity the second subsection describes how the construction of such a n i n tegrity management system itself can be automated.
An Event-Driven Semantic Integrity Management System
In order for data in the persistent store to respect the integrity constraints de ned on it, it is required that the necessary constraints be checked whenever an event occurs which m i g h t cause the constraint to be violated. These checks are to be transparent to the user, providing an active interface to the store for application programs. Adding such activeness to database systems is an area of current research it is novel in a language with orthogonal persistence. Event-driven architectures are useful where systems must respond to unpredictable conditions, or facilitate recon guration (eg, SC91]). In order not to penalise data access unduly, the IMS requires an architecture where there is no busy-waiting and no examination of irrelevant e v ents.
The event-driven architecture which supports maintenance of integrity was inspired by, but di ers substantially from, the one described in CK87] which forms the basis of the windowing system WIN (Windows In Napier88) CDKM89]. Since architectures used to support windowing systems are more familiar, the two architectures are contrasted in gure 6.
In the rst architecture (left), a procedure called an event monitor continually polls for (keyboard or mouse) events these are passed to a noti er. Applications register with the noti er, passing it a boolean-valued procedure which determines whether they are interested in a particular event. The noti er passes the event down the list until it nds an interested application, to which it passes the event. This application may beanother noti er, so The second architecture uses a structure called a catchment this is a collection of procedures which monitors the set of all events which m a y l e a d to violation of a given constraint. Each constraint or trigger is implemented by a rule object. (A rule object is an object within the system, but not within the database with which the user interacts treating rules as objects is discussed in DPG91]).
Each rule has its own catchment, and receives any event which occurs within it. Unlike in the rst architecture, the receiver of an event is not determined dynamically it is determined statically which e v ents may violate a constraint, and an appropriate catchment installed to capture them in this way, the operation of the IMS does not unduly slow data access by processing irrelevant events. In a windowing system, user input is usually intended for some particular window hence only one application receives an event. However, in the IMS, an event may potentially violate several constraints, and so fall into several catchments hence it must be distributed to all the appropriate constraints for checking. In the catchment is a procedure which determines which object may have had its integrity violated by the event (not necessarily the object to which the event occurred!) this object is passed to the handler. A handler is an object which determines what is to be done with the object passed down from the catchment, in the context of a particular rule it may for example check a condition, call a triggered procedure, log an object, or abort the current process. Each constraint is registered with one of several possible handlers. The integrity management constructs of section 2 largely work by registering rules with di erent handlers.
Example
It remains to be described what actually constitutes an event, and how i t i s captured. For clarity, rather than examine the algorithms used by the IMS, we shall consider as an example the maintenance of the constraints in the schema shown in gure 7. A particular instance of an employee object, and its associated department and manager objects, is shown in gure 8 the database will contain many such instances.
The constraint min_age applies only to the employee instance itself the only property cited by the predicate which i s t h e bodyofthe constraint is age hence the only event which c a n violate the constraint is an update to the employee's age. To maintain the constraint, it is necessary to trap all The constraint pay_policy is a constraint o ver the con guration 6 of the employee, department, and manager instances, and the wage properties of the rst and last. Changes to the wage properties, or to the con guration, could violate the constraint. Hence, if the employee instance has its wage property updated, the integrity of this instance must be checked and, if a manager instance has its wage updated, it is necessary to check the integrity, not of this manager instance, but of the employee instance to which it is related through its department 7 . Integrity must also bechecked if an employee is assigned to a new department, or a department is assigned a new head in the rst case, the employee instance itself must bechecked, in the second case, the employees which are the value of the sta property of the department. The obverse 8 updates, of assigning new sta to a department, or assigning a new department to be managed by a manager, also require a check to be performed. These events, and the objects which m ust bechecked, are summarised in table 1 self in the second column refers to the object updated.
Determination of which object(s) to check after a given update relies on being able to track back along obverse links to the object(s) on which the constraint is de ned hence it is assumed that these obverses are available. However, this is not the case where a link is through a derived object-valued property, the derivation of which involves the result of some query over the database. The reason is, that in general it is not clear that the query can beinverted in order to nd the object whose integrity may have been 6 Rules over the components of complex objects may be treated similarly. 7 In fact, one must check the integrity o f e a c h instance of the set-valued property sta of the department instance attached to this manager instance. For clarity, the fact that the integrity c heck m ust be mapped over this set is ignored here. 8 By obverse, we mean the intuitive i n verse of a potentially set-valued property (see BK91] for details) the obverse of a property f o l l o ws a backslash in a NOODL schema.
Event
Object(s) to Check update wage of employee self update wage of manager self.manages.sta update department of employee self update sta of department self.sta update head of department self.sta update`manages' of manager self.manages.sta Table 1 : Events and a ected Objects violated. This defeats the e cient implementation of a check, since if it is not known which objects may have been a ected, the whole database must bechecked. For this reason, the prototype system does not allow the de nition of constraints over object-valued derived properties, the derivation of which includes a database query. It will be clear that the events of interest are pairs, consisting of a property-update, and the class of the object updated. For example, updating the age of some object other than an employee or subclass of employee, will not require the constraint min_age to be checked.
To update the state of any object, a set-method of that object must be called this method is speci c to the update performed, and the class of object on which it is performed. The events upon which i n tegrity maintenance must beperformed then map exactly onto the calls of these set-methods. The required catchment elements are therefore compiled into these methods. Relevant e v ents are caught, whether they originate from an application program, a human interactively updating the database, or indeed from a trigger ring as the result of some other event elsewhere in the database. It is important to note that the conceptual events which may activate a rule are more than simply the invocations of methods they are declaratively speci ed changes in the state of the database catchment elements are planted wherever necessary among the methods to detect these changes of state. The catchment elements are not the rules, which are separate objects, but objects which send a message to the appropriate rule. This approach, together with the automatic generation of the appropriate method code, circumvents problems associated with encoding a rule directly with a method, (listed in DPG91]): since the rule is not present in the method, it is not necessary to touch these methods when, for example, examining the status of a rule, or altering its de nition 9 since this code is automatically generated, the programmer does not need to know about how rules interact with methods.
Integrity Maintenance in General
A similar event-driven structure can be constructed for any of the constraints and triggers expressible in NOODL (with the exception noted above) a few details have beenomitted for clarity. It may benecessary to include in a catchment, updates to instances of the transitive closure of subclasses of a class, rather than a single class. Further, the catchment may need to be enlarged to accommodate overriding in subclasses either of a rule itself, or of the properties it references. Further, since a rule may be de ned di erently over di erent classes, actual checking involves despatching on the class of the object which the event may a ect under that rule.
On the other hand, since property o b verses are automatically maintained by the system, half of the catchment elements can immediately be omitted without loss of security.
Automatic Generation of an Integrity Management System
In BK92] a schema compiler is described, which reads a schema written in NOODL, and generates the data structures necessary to represent the application model which the schema represents. The user is given a set of procedures which query and manipulate the stored data, supporting the functionality of the model on which NOODL is based Bar92]. The user has no need to know what exists behind this message interface, allowing physical data independence. Figure 9 shows the user's applications interacting with the persistent store through the automatically generated message interface. This schema compiler is being modi ed to examine the terms appearing in rule speci cations in a NOODL schema, and construct internal eventcheck tables analogous to that in table 1. It can then install the necessary Persistent Store Interface Message Applications Figure 9 : Semantically Secure Message Interface catchments for the constraints and triggers de ned in the schema. All the necessary information is available in the symbol tables of the schema compiler.
Some Related Work
Support for constraints in a persistent e n vironment is examined by C o o p e r in CQ91], where a general taxonomy of constraints is presented. This work explores what constraints can be expressed within the framework of various data models, but does not address active rules, nor strategies for management o f i n tegrity enforcement.
Owoso has described a variant of PS-algol Mor88] where assertions may be made about language objects Owo84] a modi ed compiler attempts to check these assertions statically, and if this fails, compiles an appropriate check into the user's program. This provides a useful language extension, but the assertions provided are at a physical rather than conceptual level again, active rules are outwith the scope of this work.
Hull describes an imperative language Heraclitus with a relational calculus sublanguage HJ91], which includes deltas as rst class values a delta is an object representing the change a given transaction would produce on the persistent store. Deltas can becombined, and their e ects examined, without actually updating the store. This mechanism supports some`active database' functionality in the language. However, only relations may persist, and deltas are explicitly manipulated in a procedural syntax by the user.
The integrity management constructs of section 3 are inspired by those of FCM Sut90]. However, since concurrency is not an issue here, no constructs are required to manage it. Further, the idea of default enforcement has not been supported, but this causes no loss of expressivity since the enforcement status of any rule may persist within the IMS. We have extended Sutton's constructs from constraints also to Condition-Action rules, providing di erent coupling modes for rule execution, thereby integrating constraints and triggers within the same execution model. This has lead to a more orthogonal set of constructs than those of FCM, since the clear and commit operations may occurat any time this permits,for example, trigger-ring to be suspended from one program execution to another.
Summary
Constructs for specifying semantic integrity in database schemata have been reviewed, and the realisation of these constructs in the modelling language NOODL described. We claim that although these constructs are intended as a tool for conceptual speci cation, knowledge (or assumption) of the execution model of their (possible) enforcement a vours their semantics some guidelines for the use of these constructs are given. Further, another set of constructs have been presented, which allow detailed control over the management of integrity in a system of persistent applications. A system has been described which infers which e v ents may compromise the integrity of which objects in the database serving these applications, and e ciently maintains integrity using a novel event-driven architecture. This system brings some`active database' features to a persistent programming environment.
